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Abstract 
In fighting inequality and poverty in the EU emphasis has been placed in reducing 
differences between countries and/or regions regarding certain macroeconomic 
indicators, such as the GDP per capita. However, from a policy perspective it is 
important to know the extent to which overall inequality in the EU is attributed to 
inequality between the individual countries and the extent to which it is attributed to 
inequality within them. In addition, it is important to know the extent to which income 
disparities in each individual member state contribute to overall EU inequality. 
Following certain assumptions, hypotheses and alternative scenarios, this paper 
investigates the above questions, employing a decomposition analysis of inequality by 
population subgroup and utilizing data and information provided by the CHER 
programme. A number of alternative inequality indices were used to capture the 
different aspects of inequality and test the robustness of the estimates. The suggested 
typologies of welfare state regimes were also examined to explain the differences in 
income inequality between countries and their contribution to overall EU inequality. 
Policy analysts and policy makers could benefit greatly from such information in 
evaluating, designing and implementing interventions to deal with inequality and 
poverty in the EU. 
 
 
Keywords: Income inequality, decomposition analysis, welfare state regimes, EU 
JEL-Codes: D31, D63, I30 
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1. Introduction 
 
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the structure of inequality in the EU. 
Based on empirical results, the dominant perspectives in both political and economic 
debates have emphasized the differences between the rich countries of the north and 
the poor countries of the south (including Ireland) in order to explain a large part of 
economic inequality in the EU. Thus, during the last two decades, the EU policy 
priorities have been mainly focused on reducing the differences between EU countries 
and/or regions regarding their performance in certain macroeconomic indicators.  
 
This study intends to examine the extent to which overall income inequality in the EU 
is attributed to inequality between the individual countries and the extent to which it is 
attributed to inequality within them. Furthermore, this study aims to measure the 
extent to which income disparities in each individual member state contribute to 
overall EU inequality.  During the last decade, the classification of countries in 
welfare state regime clusters has also gained increasing significance in cross-national 
comparisons of social and economic inequalities. Based on the typologies suggested 
by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and Ferrera (1996), this study also investigates 
whether these typologies help explain or classify the observed differences in income 
inequality between countries and/or their contribution to overall EU inequality.  
 
In order to explore the above questions, a decomposition analysis by population 
subgroups is employed. A number of inequality indices are used in order to capture 
the different aspects of inequality and test the robustness of the results.  The 
information provided by this analysis may prove significant for policy makers in 
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evaluating, as well as in designing and implementing effective policy interventions in 
tackling inequality and poverty in the EU.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: The data used for the analysis and 
the adopted variables are presented in Section 2. The methodology followed is 
discussed in Section 3. Emphasis is placed in presenting the properties of the 
inequality indices used and explaining the decomposition analysis by population 
subgroup, adopted in the present study. In this section, the welfare state typologies 
applied in the analysis are also presented. In Section 4 we present and discuss income 
inequality among and between EU countries, employing some conventional and 
broadly used inequality indices and summary measures. The findings of the 
decomposition analysis are demonstrated and commented on in Section 5. Finally, 
Section 6 summarises the main findings and provides some policy recommendations.  
 
 
2.  The Data 
 
This study uses data from the programme Consortium of Household panels for 
European socio-economic Research (CHER). The CHER programme aims to create a 
database with comparable data and information on the socioeconomic characteristics 
of individuals and households from 21 countries of Europe and North America. We 
make use of the 1999 CHER data for EU countries. However, there were no available 
data for Sweden. In addition, we do not include Belgium since the relevant income 
variables were considered quite problematic.  
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In our analysis total net household income is used as the main economic variable. This 
is the total household income after taxes and social security contributions, and refers 
to the year prior to the survey. Households with zero or negative income were 
excluded from the present analysis. In order to make households of different size and 
composition comparable, the modified OECD equivalence scale is used. According to 
this scale, the head of household is given a weight of 1, each additional adult a weight 
of 0.5 and each child a weight of 0.3. A household member is considered adult when 
she/he is more than 14 years old.  
 
An obstacle to similar cross-country comparisons of peoples’ standard of living and 
welfare -a standard based on information on personal income- exists due to the 
differences between countries in the relative price levels and/or expenditure and 
consumption patterns. Two main alternatives have been suggested and used broadly in 
order to overcome this problem; exchange rates and Purchasing Power Parities 
(PPPs). Following EUROSTAT (2001), we argue in favour of the PPPs as more 
appropriate, and have used them in our analysis. As Vachris and Thomas (1999) 
pointed out, PPPs provide the proper basis for cross-country comparisons because 
they are constructed by taking into account the differences between relative price 
levels and expenditure patterns across countries.  
 
 
3.  The Methodology 
 
As noted above, the main aim of this paper is to test whether overall income 
inequality in Europe is attributed mainly to inequalities between or to inequalities 
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within individual countries. The dominant view in the political and economic debate 
is that the EU consists of rich countries in the north and poor countries in the south 
(including Ireland). This difference between rich and poor countries is generally 
employed to explain a large part of income inequality in the EU. The policy 
implication of these perspectives is apparent in designing and implementing 
interventions at a national and EU level. Furthermore, in this study we intent to 
investigate whether the suggested typologies of welfare state regimes could help 
explain the differences in income inequality between countries and their contribution 
to overall EU inequality. In order to classify countries to various types of welfare 
regime, we use Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology. According to this typology, there 
are three main types of welfare state regimes; the social democratic, the corporatist 
(conservative) and the liberal. However, other authors such as Ferrera (1996), Muffels 
and Fouarge (2001) have argued that southern EU countries form a separate welfare 
regime, the southern welfare regime.1 Based on the suggestion of these studies, we 
use the following classification in our analysis that is based on Esping-Anderesen’s 
typology expanded by Ferrera’s hypothesis of the southern model:2 
 
                                                          
1 In Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology, Italy is placed within the family of the corporatist welfare 
state regime. He did not clearly include Greece, Spain and Portugal in this typology. Although he 
recognises that these countries share some common characteristics, he sees them as part of the 
corporatist regime (Esping-Andersen 1996, Arts and Gelissen 2002). A number of researchers in this 
field, such as Katrougalos (1996), support this perspective and consider these countries as a subgroup 
of the continental model. By contrast, the typology proposed by Leibfried (1992), which is based on the 
welfare policies in combating poverty, distinguishes the Latin Rim counties that include Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and France. Ferrera (1996) first talked about the “Southern model” which is 
characterised as “particularistic-clientelistic” and includes Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
2  Luxembourg was not classified in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology. However, Ferrera (1996) 
included Luxembourg in the Bismarckian model and thus we decided to consider it in our analysis as 
belonging to the group of countries with a corporatist welfare regime. Nevertheless, due to its 
population size, Luxembourg’s impact on overall EU inequality is rather marginal. Similarly, following 
Ferrera’s suggestion, we decided to consider Italy as part of the Southern model, and not part of the 
corporatist regime as Esping-Anderesen suggested.     
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Welfare state regime classification 
Liberal Conservative (Corporatist) 
Social- 
democratic Southern 
United Kingdom Germany Denmark Italy 
Ireland France Netherlands Greece 
 Luxembourg Austria Spain 
 Finland  Portugal 
 
 
In the above classification we have marked with bold those countries that most of the 
proposed classifications (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999, Leibfried 1992 and Ferrera 
1996) agree that they represent different welfare regimes (see Arts and Gelissen 
2002). Thus United Kingdom represents the liberal regime, Germany represents the 
corporatist regime and Denmark represents the Social-democratic regime. Finally, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal were not included in Esping-Andersen’s typology, but 
were included in a separate regime according to Ferera’s and Leibfried’s typologies 
and thus they are considered as representing the southern model   
 
Our analysis will unfold in three steps: First, we will present and discuss some main 
findings on inequality in EU countries employing some of the broadly used summary 
measures. Second, we will decompose EU into within-country and between country 
components. Third, we will examine the extent to which each country contributes to 
overall inequality in the EU. 
 
i. Decomposition of Inequality by Population Subgroups 
The decomposition analysis of inequality by population subgroups has been broadly 
used by various studies that investigate inequality within a country (or region). The 
population subgroups used in these studies are usually those formed according to 
certain social and demographic characteristics of the unit of analysis such as the 
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household size or type, and the age, occupational status and educational level of the 
individuals. In the present analysis, EU is considered as the total population and the 
countries as the population subgroups.  
 
This method allows us to examine the extent to which overall inequality is attributed 
to inequality between countries and to inequality within them. In order to investigate 
this, we decompose inequality into a within group and a between group component. 
The between group component is the overall inequality that would remain if all 
citizens of each country had income equal to the country’s average. The within group 
component is the inequality that would emerge if mean incomes of all countries were 
equalized, but inequality within each country remained the same. 
 
Not all inequality indices are appropriate for such an analysis. An inequality index 
could be decomposed only if total inequality were expressed as an aggregate function 
of each inequality’s subgroup, mean income and population (Cowell 1995 ).  
 
Consider a population of n  income units divided in k  subgroups with populations 
knnn ,...,, 21  and average incomes kµµµ ,...,, 21 respectively. Thus, total inequality I  
(in a given time period) for any income distribution could be expressed as: 
( )kkk nnnIIIFI ,...,,:,...,,:,...,, 212121 µµµ=  
where kI  is the inequality in group k . 
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Although there are a lot of inequality indices, only a few are additively decomposable 
by population subgroups.3 As Shorrocks (1984) and Cowell (1995) point out, all 
inequality indices with the above property belong to the family of Generalized 
Entropy Indices θΕ . This family of indices can be expressed as: 
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where iψ  is the equivalent income of household i . 
 
For each value of θ  the index can be additively decomposed as:  
WBT III +=  
where WI  is within-group inequality and BI  is between-group inequality.  
 
The between group inequality could be written as: 
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3 A more detailed discussion on the indices that are suitable for this type of decomposition analysis and 
their properties provided by Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980, 1988, 1995) Shorrocks (1980) Anand 
(1983).   
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For the decomposition analysis of inequality, the following three indices, part of the 
family of Generalized Entropy measures θE , were used; 0E : Mean Logarithmic 
Deviation ( L ), 1E  : Theil index (T ) and 2E : Half the Squared Coefficient of 
Variation )2( 2C . Decomposition of T  and L  by k  population subgroups is done as 
follows: 


 −


+


= ∑∑
==
µµµ
µ
µ
µ
lnln
11
k
i
i
ii
k
i
i
ii
n
n
T
n
n
T  
 


 

−+

= ∑∑
==
k
i
i
i
k
i
i
i
n
n
L
n
n
L
11
lnln µµ  
 
Among the Generalized Entropy Measures, as θ  decreases the index becomes more 
sensitive to transfers at the lower income strata. The Generalized Entropy Measures 
function is differentiable with respect to incomes. Following Shorrocks (1980), this 
means that the change ( )δψψ βα ,,∆  in the index value corresponding to a transfer of 
an income portion δ  from one person with income αψ  to another with income βψ  
can be effectively approximated by the differential of the θΕ  function. 
( ) ( ) ( )δψδψδµψθθδψψ βθαθ
θ
βα −⋅∂
Ε∂+⋅∂
Ε∂=⋅






 −



−=∆ ∑= 1
1
1
1,,
1
n
i
i
n
d  
then ( ) ( ) ( )θβθαθβα ψψµθδδψψ −− −−= 111,, nd   if  1,0≠θ . 
 
Consequently, among the above three indices L  is more sensitive to transfers at the 
lower income strata and )2( 2C  is more sensitive to differences at the top.  
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ii. Country contribution to within group component of overall EU inequality 
One of the aims of this study is to examine the extent to which each country is 
‘responsible’ for the within group component of overall inequality in the EU. As we 
can easily calculate, country i  contributes to the within group component of overall 
inequality indices by: 
i
i
wi Ln
n
L =  
i
ii
wi Tn
nT µ
µ=  
( ) ( )
i
iii
wi
C
n
n
n
nC
22
2
12
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−

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

= µ
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A problem in performing this analysis is related to the fact that the sample sizes of the 
CHER survey are not proportional to the real population of each EU country. For this 
reason, in our analysis we weight cases by the ratio of the real country’s population to 
the CHER sample size for each country. However, in the interpretation of our results 
we take into account the ratio of each country’s population to overall EU population. 
 
Of course, in interpreting our findings, we cannot be certain of the extent to which any 
within group contribution a country has on overall inequality is attributed to that 
country’s population. Obviously, countries with large populations will contribute 
more to the within group component of overall EU inequality than countries with 
smaller populations. In order to overcome this problem and present estimates on each 
country’s contribution to overall inequality immune from its population size, we also 
perform the same decomposition analysis supposing that all countries have the same 
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population.4 Thus the question we investigate is what would be the contribution of 
each individual country to overall EU inequality if all countries had an equal size 
population. 
 
 
4. Income Inequality in EU Countries 
 
Employing some conventional inequality indices and summary measures is the most 
usual way for appraising income inequality among and between countries. Table 1 
presents the estimates on inequality based on some of the most widely used indices; 
the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (L), the Theil index (T), the Gini and the Squared 
Coefficient of Variation )2( 2C . These indices have been used extensively in similar 
exercises and fulfil the most desirable properties that inequality indices should have; 
the anonymity, the mean independence, the population independence and the principle 
of transfers (see Jenkins 1991, Cowell 1995).  
 
As we can observe in Table 1, inequality of income varies considerably between EU 
countries. However, as also Table 2 shows, the rank of these countries according to 
the degree of inequality is affected significantly by the inequality index used. 
Estimates of Mean Logarithmic Deviation (L) rank Portugal first, as the country with 
the highest inequality, followed by Greece, Spain, Ireland and the UK. The smallest 
inequality is observed in Luxembourg followed by Denmark and the Netherlands.  
 
                                                          
4 We assume that all countries have 1000 households and thus we weight our data accordingly. More 
specifically, we weight each case (household income) by the ratio of 1000 to the country’s (CHER) 
sample size. This has no effect on the measurement of inequality in each individual county since 
Generalized Entropy Indices satisfy the property of population independence.  
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Table 1 
INCOME INEQUALITY IN EU COUNTRIES (CHER 1999) 
Welfare regime Country 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Deviation 
Theil 
Half the 
squared 
coefficient 
of Variation 
Gini Cases 
The Netherlands 0.138 0.140 0.213 0.267 4883 
Denmark 0.118 0.120 0.166 0.251 2331 Social-democratic 
Austria 0.160 0.154 0.208 0.287 2809 
Luxembourg 0.116 0.128 0.182 0.263 2374 
France 0.163 0.172 0.334 0.296 5593 
Finland 0.161 0.157 0.209 0.291 3816 
Corporatist 
Germany 0.140 0.126 0.154 0.265 6993 
United Kingdom 0.189 0.183 0.267 0.317 4252 
Liberal 
Ireland 0.208 0.248 0.640 0.341 2372 
Italy 0.175 0.162 0.205 0.303 6148 
Greece 0.239 0.232 0.324 0.362 3949 
Portugal 0.255 0.252 0.358 0.375 4631 
Southern 
Spain 0.210 0.188 0.235 0.331 5301 
EU(13)  0.187 0.176 0.258   
Note:  All incomes are equivalized by the relevant modified OECD scale   
 
 
This ordering changes to some extent when estimates of the Theil index are used.  
Portugal is still the country with the highest inequality but now Ireland takes the 
second place, followed by Greece, Spain and France. Denmark is the country with the 
lowest inequality followed by Germany and Luxembourg. When in our exercise 
estimates on the Half of the Squared Coefficient of Variation are used, Ireland 
becomes the country with the highest inequality, followed by Portugal, France and 
Greece.  Similar differences in inequality ordering between these countries are shown 
when the Gini index is used. However, differences in inequality ordering have been 
observed in similar studies (see Smeeding 1991, Atkinson et al 1995, Papatheodorou 
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et al 2002). These differences are attributed to the fact that inequality indices are not 
value free; each of them is more sensitive to transfers on different parts of the 
distribution of income.5  
 
 
Table 2 
INEQUALITY RANKING FOR EU COUNTRIES  (CHER 1999) 
Welfare 
State 
Regime 
Country 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Deviation 
Theil 
Half the 
Squared 
Coefficient 
of Variation
Gini 
Denmark 12 13 12 13 
Netherlands 11 10 7 10 
Social- 
democratic 
Austria 9 9 9 9 
Germany 10 12 13 11 
Luxembourg 13 11 11 12 
France 7 6 3 7 
Corporatist
Finland 8 8 8 8 
United Kingdom 5 5 5 5 Liberal 
Ireland 4 2 1 3 
Italy 6 7 10 6 
Greece 2 3 4 2 
Spain 3 4 6 4 
Southern 
Portugal 1 1 2 1 
Note: Countries are sorted in descending order with respect to the values of the 
inequality index. 
 
 
One general comment we can draw form Table 1 is that, the estimates of all indices 
employed show that the countries which are categorized as belonging to the southern 
welfare regime type show relatively high rates of inequality.  All indices used show 
that the countries belonging to this group, with the exception of Italy, have higher 
                                                          
5 A presentation of inequality indices and their properties can be found in Atkinson 1983, Atkinson and 
Bourguignon (2000), Anand (1983), Jenkins (1991), Lambert (1993), Cowell (1995), Sen (1997). 
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inequality than the overall inequality found in the EU(13).6 High levels of inequality 
were also found in the countries of the liberal welfare regime. Inequality in the UK 
and Ireland is always higher than the corresponding figures for EU(13). By contrast, 
the countries of the social-democratic welfare regime, show relatively low levels of 
inequality which are well below the corresponding figures for overall inequality in the 
EU(13). Similarly relatively low levels of inequality were also found in the countries 
of the corporatist welfare regime. With the exception of France, the corresponding 
figures in all countries of this regime shows that inequality is always lower than the 
one found in total EU(13).7  However, when we look at the representative countries of 
each regime, we have a clearer picture of the differences in inequality between 
welfare regimes. The lowest inequality was found in Denmark (social-democratic 
regime), followed by Germany (corporatist regime) which also shows lower level of 
inequality than EU(13). The worst performance in inequality was found in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain (southern model), followed by the United Kingdom (liberal 
regime). The inequality in all these countries is found to be higher than the 
representative figures for the total EU. 
 
Accounting for the properties of the inequality indices used in the present analysis 
could help us shed more light on our conclusions and make some interesting 
observations. In Table 2, the countries are sorted in descending order with respect to 
the values of the inequality indices that belong to the Generalised Entropy family and 
Gini index. We can see that the rank of southern European countries is lower when 
the value of parameter θ  is also low and the rank becomes higher as the value of θ  
                                                          
6 An exception is the figure given by Half the Squared Coefficient of Variation for Spain, which is 
slightly higher than the corresponding figure for total EU(13). 
7 The inequality in France is found to be higher than the total inequality in EU(13) when measured by 
the Half the Squared Coefficient of Variation.  
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increases. This indicates that the countries of the southern welfare regime have greater 
income disparities at the lower income strata. By contrast, the rank of Ireland and 
France becomes higher as θ  decreases. This shows that the countries have relatively 
higher income inequality among upper income groups. Germany, which is considered 
representative of the corporatist welfare regime, shows lower rank for higher values of 
θ . However, the way that income is distributed among the people varies also 
considerably among countries belonging to the same welfare state regime. 
 
 
5.  Countries’ Contribution to Overall EU Inequality 
 
The analysis in the previous section has provided figures on the inequality in EU 
countries, by employing some of the broadly used indices and summary measures. 
Although this information is quite valuable in comparing inequality between 
countries, it does not say much about the extent to which this inequality contributes to 
overall inequality in the EU. Furthermore, from a policy perspective it is very 
important to have information on the extent to which overall inequality in the EU is 
attributable to inequality between countries and on the extent to which it is 
attributable to inequality within countries. To investigate these issues, we first 
decompose EU inequality into within-counties and between-countries components. 
The analysis in Table 3 shows that, according to all the indices used, the between-
countries inequality accounts for only a small part of the overall inequality in the EU. 
None of the indices show that more than 7.8% of overall inequality is attributable to 
the between-group component. In other words, more than 92% of overall EU 
inequality is attributed to income disparities within member states. The lowest 
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contribution (5%) that the between-group component has on overall inequality was 
given by the Half the Squared Coefficient of Variation, which among these indices is 
the most sensitive index to disparities at the higher income strata.  
 
Table 3 
DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS OF INEQUALITY IN EU BY 
POPULATION SUBGROUPS (COUNTRIES) - (CHER 1999) 
INDEX Between countries component  Total 
0.015 MEAN LOGARITHMIC 
DEVIATION (7.8%) 
0.187 
0.014 
THEIL 
(7.7%) 
0.176 
0.013 HALF SQUARED 
COEFFICIENT OF 
VARIATION (5.0%) 
0.258 
Note: All incomes have been equivalized and weighted with respect to the relevant Purchasing 
Power Parity index  
 
In Table 4, the contribution of each EU country to the within group component of 
overall EU inequality is presented. As expected, the impact that each individual 
country has on the overall within-group component of EU inequality is affected by the 
inequality indices used. Of course, as already mentioned the contribution that each 
country has to the within-group component of overall EU inequality is affected by the 
size of its population. As we can see, the southern EU countries’ contribution 
decreases as the value of parameter θ  increases, while for the most of the other 
countries their contribution to the within part of overall inequality rises as the value of 
θ  increases. The countries of the southern welfare regime contribute to the within 
part of overall inequality more than they proportionally contribute to overall EU 
population, when indices more sensitive to transfers at the lower income strata (Mean 
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Logarithmic Deviation) are used. By contrast, the rest of the indices, which are more 
sensitive to income disparities at the higher income strata, show that the same group 
of countries contribute to overall inequality less than they contribute to the overall EU 
population. Concerning the countries of the liberal regime, all the indices employed in 
the analysis showed that their contribution to the within part of overall EU inequality 
is higher than their proportional contribution to EU population. These trends can be 
seen more clearly in Table 5, where each country’s contribution to the within-country 
component of overall EU inequality is presented, under the assumption that all 
countries have the same population. In other words, the information presented in this 
Table shows what would be the contribution of each individual country to overall EU 
inequality if all countries had an equal size population.  
 
Table 4 
COUNTRIES' CONTRIBUTION TO WITHIN COUNTRY COMPONENT IN 
OVERALL EU INEQUALITY  (CHER 1999) 
Welfare 
regime Country 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Deviation 
Theil 
Half the 
squared 
coefficient 
of Variation 
EU 
population 
percentage 
The Netherlands 3.5% 4.4% 5.2% 4.4% 
Denmark 1.0% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% Social-democratic 
Austria 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 
Luxembourg 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
France 15.9% 19.2% 26.8% 16.9% 
Finland 1.4% 1.3% 1.1% 1.5% 
Corporatist 
Germany 18.6% 19.0% 16.6% 22.9% 
United Kingdom 17.9% 21.2% 23.7% 16.4% 
Liberal 
Ireland 1.2% 1.6% 2.7% 1.0% 
Italy 16.3% 14.0% 10.3% 16.1% 
Greece 4.1% 2.7% 1.6% 2.9% 
Portugal 4.5% 2.8% 1.6% 3.0% 
Southern 
Spain 13.4% 9.9% 6.3% 11.0% 
Note: All incomes (which are taken in OECD equivalence scale) have been weighted with respect to the 
relevant Purchasing Power Parity index. Real population have been used. 
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Table 5 
COUNTRIES' CONTRIBUTION TO WITHIN COUNTRY 
COMPONENT IN OVERALL EU INEQUALITY, 
ASSUMING THAT ALL COUNTRIES HAVE A POPULATION OF AN 
EQUAL SIZE (CHER 1999) 
Welfare 
regime Country 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Deviation 
Theil 
Half the 
squared 
coefficient of 
Variation 
The Netherlands 6.1% 7.5% 8.5% 
Denmark 5.2% 6.5% 6.9% Social-democratic 
Austria 7.1% 7.7% 7.3% 
Luxembourg 5.2% 11.0% 18.9% 
France 7.3% 8.5% 11.4% 
Finland 7.2% 6.8% 5.5% 
Corporatist 
Germany 6.2% 6.1% 5.2% 
United Kingdom 8.4% 9.6% 10.4% 
Liberal 
Ireland 9.2% 11.3% 18.5% 
Italy 7.8% 6.4% 4.6% 
Greece 10.6% 6.8% 3.9% 
Portugal 11.3% 6.9% 3.7% 
Southern 
Spain 9.4% 6.7% 4.1% 
 
 
The group of countries belonging to the social-democratic welfare regime have a 
relatively lower contribution to the overall EU inequality than their proportional 
contribution to EU population.8 Their contribution to overall EU inequality is higher 
when indices more sensitive to transfers at the higher levels of the income distribution 
are used. Those countries that are considered part of the corporatist welfare state 
regime do not show a clear trend. All indices used show that Germany’s and Finland’s 
contribution to the within group component of overall inequality is less than their 
contribution to EU population. However, the opposite results were found for 
Luxembourg. France contributes to (the within group) overall inequality more than it 
contributes to overall EU population when indices more sensitive to transfers at the 
                                                          
8 The only exception is the estimates given by Half the Squared Coefficient of Variation for the 
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higher income strata are used. The opposite results are found when indices more 
sensitive to transfers at the lower income strata are used. Based on the findings of 
Table 5 we may argue that when indices more sensitive to the transfers at the lower 
parts of the distribution are used, the countries of the southern model -with the 
exception of Italy- are those with the highest contribution to overall EU inequality.  
On this matter Italy shows more similarities with Germany and Finland (corporatist 
regime). By contrast, indices more sensitive to transfers at the higher income strata 
show that the countries of the liberal regime, as well as France and Luxembourg, are 
those with the highest contribution to overall EU inequality.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion and discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the extent to which overall inequality in the 
EU is attributed to inequality between the individual countries and the extent to which 
it is attributed to the inequality within them. Furthermore, it aimed to examine the 
extent to which income disparities in each county contribute to overall EU inequality. 
The typology of welfare state regimes which is suggested by Esping-Andersen (1990), 
expanded by Ferreras’ (1996) hypothesis for the southern model,  was also examined 
in order to explain the differences on income inequality between countries and their 
separate contribution to overall EU inequality.  
 
The results show that any attempt to rank countries according to the degree of 
inequality is affected significantly by the particular index used. Estimates based on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Netherlands, which shows that the country’s contribution to overall EU inequality is higher to 
country’s relative contribution to EU population 
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inequality indices more responsive to transfers at the lower parts of the distribution 
show that the countries of the southern welfare regime are those with the highest 
inequality. By contrast, countries of the social-democratic welfare regime show 
relatively low levels of inequality, which are much lower than the corresponding 
figures for overall inequality in the EU(13). The countries of the corporatist welfare 
regime vary significantly between them in the way that income is distributed among 
their population.   
  
In order to investigate the extent to which overall inequality in EU is attributed to 
inequality between member states or within them, a decomposition analysis by 
population subgroups was employed. It was found that, according to all indices used, 
the between countries inequality component accounts only for a small part of overall 
inequality in the EU. The policy implication of these findings is apparent. Policies 
aiming to reduce inequality within each EU country would be far more effective in 
reducing overall inequality (and consequently income poverty) in the EU than policies 
targeting to reduce (only) disparities in average per-capita income (or GDP) between 
member states. In the light of these findings, we argue that the enforcement of social 
policies aiming to reduce inequality should become top priority on the national and 
EU policy agenda.   
 
Examining each county's contribution to the within group component of overall EU 
inequality we see that the results vary according to the inequality index used. Indices 
more sensitive to the disparities at the low income strata show that the countries of the 
southern welfare state regime type have a larger contribution to overall EU inequality 
than their proportional contribution of EU population. The contribution of these 
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countries to overall inequality decreases, as indices more sensitive to transfers at the 
higher income strata are used. However, almost all the other countries show an 
opposite trend. Their contribution to the within part component of overall EU 
inequality increases as indices more sensitive to the disparities at the higher income 
strata are used. The countries that represent the liberal welfare regime appear to have 
a high contribution to the overall EU inequality. This contribution is always higher 
than each country’s contribution to EU population, irrespectively of the inequality 
index used. By contrast, the countries of the corporatist welfare regime show very 
mixed results. France shows many similarities on this mater with the UK. Germany is 
the only country of the corporatist regime where all the indices used show a lower 
contribution to overall EU inequality than its contribution to EU population. The rest 
of the countries in this group appear to have a lower contribution to overall EU 
inequality than their relevant contribution to EU population only when indices more 
sensitive to the transfers at the low income strata are used. Finally, the countries of the 
social-democratic welfare regime were found, in general, to have a low contribution 
to the within group component of overall EU inequality.   
 
The welfare state regimes, as they were introduced in the present analysis, cannot, of 
course, fully explain the differences in inequality between countries and/or the 
contribution of each country to overall EU inequality. However, the findings show 
that we cannot diminish their significance as a valuable frame of reference for 
examining and appraising differences between countries. Countries of the southern 
welfare regime were found, in general, to have high income inequality which, 
compared to the rest of the EU countries, is largely attributed to income disparities at 
the lower income strata. This group of countries also appears to have a high 
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contribution to overall EU inequality. The country of the liberal welfare regime is the 
one found to always have a higher contribution to overall EU inequality than the 
country’s contribution to total EU population, irrespectively of the index’s sensitivity 
to transfers at various parts of the distribution. It could, therefore, be argued that the 
southern and liberal welfare regimes are those which perform worse when it comes to 
income inequality figures and in regards to a country’s contribution to overall EU 
inequality. By contrast, countries of the social-democratic welfare regime are 
generally found to perform better on these matters. This group of countries show low 
rates of inequality -lower that the average figures for the total EU- and low 
contribution to the within country component of overall EU inequality.  Finally, no 
clear similar trends can be found for countries that belong to the corporatist welfare 
regime. Further refinement of the welfare state regimes typologies would allow us to 
further elucidate these matters and to appraise more accurately the impact that various 
welfare regimes have on income inequality and poverty. Policy makers and policy 
analysts could greatly benefit in the designing of policy interventions and/or the 
reforming of social and economic policies, in tackling poverty and reducing income 
inequality at a national and EU level. 
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